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Abstract
Subspace clustering is an unsupervised learning problem that aims at grouping
data points into multiple “clusters” so that data points in a single cluster lie ap-
proximately on a low-dimensional linear subspace. It is originally motivated by
3D motion segmentation in computer vision, but has recently been generically
applied to a wide range of statistical machine learning problems, which often in-
volves sensitive datasets about human subjects. This raises a dire concern for
data privacy. In this work, we build on the framework of differential privacy
and present two provably private subspace clustering algorithms. We demonstrate
via both theory and experiments that one of the presented methods enjoys formal
privacy and utility guarantees; the other one asymptotically preserves differential
privacy while having good performance in practice. Along the course of the proof,
we also obtain two new provable guarantees for the agnostic subspace clustering
and the graph connectivity problem which might be of independent interests.
1 Introduction
Subspace clustering was originally proposed to solve very specific computer vision problems having
a union-of-subspace structure in the data, e.g., motion segmentation under an affine camera model
[11] or face clustering under Lambertian illumination models [15]. As it gains increasing attention
in the statistics and machine learning community, people start to use it as an agnostic learning tool in
social network [5], movie recommendation [33] and biological datasets [19]. The growing applica-
bility of subspace clustering in these new domains inevitably raises the concern of data privacy, as
many such applications involve dealing with sensitive information. For example, [19] applies sub-
space clustering to identify diseases from personalized medical data and [33] in fact uses subspace
clustering as a effective tool to conduct linkage attacks on individuals in movie rating datasets. Nev-
ertheless, privacy issues in subspace clustering have been less explored in the past literature, with
the only exception of a brief analysis and discussion in [29]. However, the algorithms and analysis
presented in [29] have several notable deficiencies. For example, data points are assumed to be inco-
herent and it only protects the differential privacy of any feature of a user rather than the entire user
profile in the database. The latter means it is possible for an attacker to infer with high confidence
whether a particular user is in the database, given sufficient side information.
It is perhaps reasonable why there is little work focusing on private subspace clustering, which
is by all means a challenging task. For example, a negative result in [29] shows that if utility is
measured in terms of exact clustering, then no private subspace clustering algorithm exists when
neighboring databases are allowed to differ on an entire user profile. In addition, state-of-the-art
subspace clustering methods like Sparse Subspace Clustering (SSC, [11]) lack a complete analysis of
its clustering output, thanks to the notorious “graph connectivity” problem [21]. Finally, clustering
could have high global sensitivity even if only cluster centers are released, as depicted in Figure 1.
As a result, general private data releasing schemes like output perturbation [7, 8, 2] do not apply.
In this work, we present a systematic and principled treatment of differentially private subspace
clustering. To circumvent the negative result in [29], we use the perturbation of recovered low-
1
dimensional subspace from the ground truth as the utility measure. Our contributions are two-fold.
First, we analyze two efficient algorithms based on the sample-aggregate framework [22] and estab-
lished formal privacy and utility guarantees when data are generated from some stochastic model or
satisfy certain deterministic separation conditions. New results on (non-private) subspace clustering
are obtained along our analysis, including a fully agnostic subspace clustering on well-separated
datasets using stability arguments and exact clustering guarantee for thresholding-based subspace
clustering (TSC, [14]) in the noisy setting. In addition, we employ the exponential mechanism [18]
and propose a novel Gibbs sampler for sampling from this distribution, which involves a novel tweak
in sampling from a matrix Bingham distribution. The method works well in practice and we show it
is closely related to the well-known mixtures of probabilistic PCA model [27].
Related work Subspace clustering can be thought as a generalization of PCA and k-means clus-
tering. The former aims at finding a single low-dimensional subspace and the latter uses zero-
dimensional subspaces as cluster centers. There has been extensive research on private PCA
[2, 4, 10] and k-means [2, 22, 26]. Perhaps the most similar work to ours is [22, 4]. [22] applies the
sample-aggregate framework to k-means clustering and [4] employs the exponential mechanism to
recover private principal vectors. In this paper we give non-trivial generalization of both work to the
private subspace clustering setting.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
For a vector x ∈ Rd, its p-norm is defined as ‖x‖p = (
∑
i x
p
i )
1/p. If p is not explicitly specified
then the 2-norm is used. For a matrix A ∈ Rn×m, we use σ1(A) ≥ · · · ≥ σn(A) ≥ 0 to
denote its singular values (assuming without loss of generality that n ≤ m). We use ‖ · ‖ξ to
denote matrix norms, with ξ = 2 the matrix spectral norm and ξ = F the Frobenious norm. That
is, ‖A‖2 = σ1(A) and ‖A‖F =
√∑n
i=1 σi(A)
2. For a q-dimensional subspace S ⊆ Rd, we
associate with a basis U ∈ Rd×q , where the q columns in U are orthonormal and S = range(U).
We use Sdq to denote the set of all q-dimensional subspaces in Rd.
Given x ∈ Rd and S ⊆ Rd, the distance d(x,S) is defined as d(x,S) = infy∈S ‖x− y‖2. If S is
a subspace associated with a basis U , then we have d(x,S) = ‖x − PS(x)‖2 = ‖x −UU>x‖2,
where PS(·) denotes the projection operator onto subspace S . For two subspaces S,S ′ of dimension
q, the distance d(S,S ′) is defined as the Frobenious norm of the sin matrix of principal angles; i.e.,
d(S,S ′) = ‖ sin Θ(S,S ′)‖F = ‖UU> −U′U′>‖F , (1)
where U,U′ are orthonormal basis associated with S and S ′, respectively.
2.2 Subspace clustering
Given n data points x1, · · · ,xn ∈ Rd, the task of subspace clustering is to cluster the data points
into k clusters so that data points within a subspace lie approximately on a low-dimensional sub-
space. Without loss of generality, we assume ‖xi‖2 ≤ 1 for all i = 1, · · · , n. We also use
X = {x1, · · · ,xn} to denote the dataset and X ∈ Rd×n to denote the data matrix by stacking
all data points in columnwise order. Subspace clustering seeks to find k q-dimensional subspaces
Cˆ = {Sˆ1, · · · , Sˆk} so as to minimize the Wasserstein’s distance or distance squared defined as
d2W (Cˆ, C∗) = min
pi:[k]→[k]
k∑
i=1
d2(Sˆi,S∗pi(i)), (2)
where pi are taken over all permutations on [k] and S∗ are the optimal/ground-truth subspaces. In a
model based approach, C∗ is fixed and data points {xi}ni=1 are generated either deterministically or
stochastically from one of the ground-truth subspaces in C∗ with noise corruption; for a completely
agnostic setting, C∗ is defined as the minimizer of the k-means subspace clustering objective:
C∗ := argminC={S1,··· ,Sk}⊆Sdq cost(C;X ) = argminC={S1,··· ,Sk}⊆Sdq
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
j
d2(xi,Sj). (3)
To simplify notations, we use ∆k(X ) = cost(C∗;X ) to denote cost of the optimal solution.
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Algorithm 1 The sample-aggregate framework [22]
1: Input: X = {xi}ni=1 ⊆ Rd, number of subsets m, privacy parameters ε, δ; f , dM.
2: Initialize: s =
√
m, α = ε/(5
√
2 ln(2/δ)), β = ε/(4(D + ln(2/δ))).
3: Subsampling: Select m random subsets of size n/m of X independently and uniformly at
random without replacement. Repeat this step until no single data point appears in more than√
m of the sets. Mark the subsampled subsets XS1 , · · · ,XSm .
4: Separate queries: Compute B = {si}mi=1 ⊆ RD, where si = f(XSi).
5: Aggregation: Compute g(B) = si∗ where i∗ = argminmi=1ri(t0) with t0 = (m+s2 + 1). Here
ri(t0) denotes the distance dM(·, ·) between si and the t0-th nearest neighbor to si in B.
6: Noise calibration: Compute S(B) = 2 maxk(ρ(t0 + (k+ 1)s) · e−βk), where ρ(t) is the mean
of the top bs/βc values in {r1(t), · · · , rm(t)}.
7: Output: A(X ) = g(B) + S(B)α u, where u is a standard Gaussian random vector.
2.3 Differential privacy
Definition 2.1 (Differential privacy, [7, 8]). A randomized algorithmA is (ε, δ)-differentially private
if for all X ,Y satisfying d(X ,Y) = 1 and all sets S of possible outputs the following holds:
Pr[A(X ) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr[A(Y) ∈ S] + δ. (4)
In addition, if δ = 0 then the algorithm A is ε-differentially private.
In our setting, the distance d(·, ·) between two datasets X and Y is defined as the number of different
columns in X and Y. Differential privacy ensures the output distribution is obfuscated to the point
that every user has a plausible deniability about being in the dataset, and in addition any inferences
about individual user will have nearly the same confidence before and after the private release.
3 Sample-aggregation based private subspace clustering
In this section we first summarize the sample-aggregate framework introduced in [22] and argue
why it should be preferred to conventional output perturbation mechanisms [7, 8] for subspace clus-
tering. We then analyze two efficient algorithms based on the sample-aggregate framework and
prove formal privacy and utility guarantees. We also prove new results in our analysis regarding
the stability of k-means subspace clustering (Lem. 3.3) and graph connectivity (i.e., consistency) of
noisy threshold-based subspace clustering (TSC, [14]) under a stochastic model (Lem. 3.5).
3.1 Smooth local sensitivity and the sample-aggregate framework
Figure 1: Illustration of instability of k-means
subspace clustering solutions (d = 2, k = 2, q =
1). Blue dots represent evenly spaced data points
on the unit circle; blue crosses indicate an addi-
tional data point. Red lines are optimal solutions.
Most existing privacy frameworks [7, 8] are
based on the idea of global sensitivity, which
is defined as the maximum output perturbation
‖f(X1) − f(X2)‖ξ, where maximum is over
all neighboring databases X1,X2 and ξ = 1 or
2. Unfortunately, global sensitivity of cluster-
ing problems is usually high even if only clus-
ter centers are released. For example, Figure
1 shows that the global sensitivity of k-means
subspace clustering could be as high as O(1),
which ruins the algorithm utility.
To circumvent the above-mentioned chal-
lenges, Nissim et al. [22] introduces the
sample-aggregate framework based on the con-
cept of a smooth version of local sensitivity.
Unlike global sensitivity, local sensitivity measures the maximum perturbation ‖f(X ) − f(X ′)‖ξ
over all databases X ′ neighboring to the input database X . The proposed sample-aggregate frame-
work (pseudocode in Alg. 1) enjoys local sensitivity and comes with the following guarantee:
Theorem 3.1 ([22], Theorem 4.2). Let f : D → RD be an efficiently computable function where
D is the collection of all databases and D is the output dimension. Let dM(·, ·) be a semimetric on
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the outer space of f . 1 Set ε > 2D/
√
m and m = ω(log2 n). The sample-aggregate algorithm
A in Algorithm 1 is an efficient (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm. Furthermore, if f and m are
chosen such that the `1 norm of the output of f is bounded by Λ and
Pr
XS⊆X
[dM(f(XS), c) ≤ r] ≥ 3
4
(5)
for some c ∈ RD and r > 0, then the standard deviation of Gaussian noise added is upper bounded
by O(r/ε) + Λε e
−Ω( ε
√
m
D ). In addition, when m satisfies m = ω(D2 log2(r/Λ)/ε2), with high
probability each coordinate ofA(X )− c¯ is upper bounded by O(r/ε), where c¯ depending onA(X )
satisfies dM(c, c¯) = O(r).
Let f be any subspace clustering solver that outputs k estimated low-dimensional subspaces and
dM be the Wasserstein’s distance as defined in Eq. (2). Theorem 3.1 provides privacy guarantee
for an efficient meta-algorithm with any f . In addition, utility guarantee holds with some more
assumptions on input dataset X . In following sections we establish utility guarantees. The main
idea is to prove stability results as outlined in Eq. (5) for particular subspace clustering solvers and
then apply Theorem 3.1.
3.2 The agnostic setting
We first consider the setting when data points {xi}ni=1 are arbitrarily placed. Under such agnostic
setting the optimal solution C∗ is defined as the one that minimizes the k-means cost as in Eq. (3).
The solver f is taken to be any (1 + )-approximation2 of optimal k-means subspace clustering; that
is, f always outputs subspaces Cˆ satisfying cost(Cˆ;X ) ≤ (1 + )cost(C∗;X ). Efficient core-set
based approximation algorithms exist, for example, in [12]. The key task of this section it to identify
assumptions under which the stability condition in Eq. (5) holds with respect to an approximate
solver f . The example given in Figure 1 also suggests that identifiability issue arises when the input
data X itself cannot be well clustered. For example, no two straight lines could well approximate
data uniformly distributed on a circle. To circumvent the above-mentioned difficulty, we impose the
following well-separation condition on the input data X :
Definition 3.2 (Well-separation condition for k-means subspace clustering). A dataset X is
(φ, η, ψ)-well separated if there exist constants φ, η and ψ, all between 0 and 1, such that
∆2k(X ) ≤ min
{
φ2∆2k−1(X ),∆2k,−(X )− ψ,∆2k,+(X ) + η
}
, (6)
where ∆k−1, ∆k,− and ∆k,+ are defined as ∆2k−1(X ) = minS1:k−1∈Sdq cost({Si};X ); ∆2k,−(X ) =
minS1∈Sdq−1,S2:k∈Sdq cost({Si};X ); and ∆2k,+(X ) = minS1∈Sdq+1,S2:k∈Sdq cost({Si};X ).
The first condition in Eq. (6), ∆2k(X ) ≤ φ2∆2k−1(X ), constrains that the input dataset X cannot
be well clustered using k − 1 instead of k clusters. It was introduced in [23] to analyze stability of
k-means solutions. For subspace clustering, we need another two conditions regarding the intrinsic
dimension of each subspace. The ∆2k(X ) ≤ ∆2k,−(X ) − ψ asserts that replacing a q-dimensional
subspace with a (q − 1)-dimensional one is not sufficient, while ∆2k(X ) ≤ ∆2k,+(X ) + η means an
additional subspace dimension does not help much with clustering X .
The following lemma is our main stability result for subspace clustering on well-separated datasets.
It states that when a candidate clustering Cˆ is close to the optimal clustering C∗ in terms of clustering
cost, they are also close in terms of the Wasserstein distance defined in Eq. (2).
Lemma 3.3 (Stability of agnostic k-means subspace clustering). Assume X is (φ, η, ψ)-well sepa-
rated with φ2 < 1/1602, ψ > η. Suppose a candidate clustering Cˆ = {Sˆ1, · · · , Sˆk} ⊆ Sdq satisfies
cost(Cˆ;X ) ≤ a · cost(C∗;X ) for some a < 1−802φ2800φ2 . Then the following holds:
dW (Cˆ, C∗) ≤ 600
√
2φ2
√
k
(1− 150φ2)(ψ − η) . (7)
The following theorem is then a simple corollary, with a complete proof in Appendix B.
1dM(·, ·) satisfies dM(x, y) ≥ 0, dM(x, x) = 0 and dM(x, y) ≤ dM(x, z) + dM(y, z) for all x, y, z.
2Here  is an approximation constant and is not related to the privacy parameter ε.
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Algorithm 2 Threshold-based subspace clustering (TSC), a simplified version
1: Input: X = {xi}ni=1 ⊆ Rd, number of clusters k and number of neighbors s.
2: Thresholding: construct G ∈ {0, 1}n×n by connecting xi to the other s data points in X with
the largest absolute inner products |〈xi,x′〉|. Complete G so that it is undirected.
3: Clustering: Let X (1), · · · ,X (`) be the connected components in G. Construct X¯ (`) by sam-
pling q points from X (`) uniformly at random without replacement.
4: Output: subspaces Cˆ = {Sˆ(`)}k`=1; Sˆ(`) is the subspace spanned by q arbitrary points in X¯ (`).
Theorem 3.4. Fix a (φ, η, ψ)-well separated dataset X with n data points and φ2 < 1/1602,
ψ > η. Suppose XS ⊆ X is a subset of X with size m, sampled uniformly at random without
replacement. Let Cˆ = {Sˆ1, · · · , Sˆ2} be an (1 + )-approximation of optimal k-means subspace
clustering computed on XS . If m = Ω(kqd log(qd/γ
′∆2k(X ))
γ′2∆4k(X )
) with γ′ < 1−802φ
2
800φ2 − 2(1 + ), then we
have:
Pr
XS
[
dW (Cˆ, C∗) ≤ 600
√
2φ2
√
k
(1− 150φ2)(ψ − η)
]
≥ 3
4
, (8)
where C∗ = {S∗1 , · · · ,S∗k} is the optimal clustering on X ; that is, cost(C∗;X ) = ∆2k(X ).
Consequently, applying Theorem 3.4 together with the sample-aggregate framework we obtain a
weak polynomial-time ε-differentially private algorithm for agnostic k-means subspace clustering,
with additional amount of per-coordinate Gaussian noise upper bounded by O( φ
2
√
k
ε(ψ−η) ). Our bound
is comparable to the one obtained in [22] for private k-means clustering, except for the (ψ−η) term
which characterizes the well-separatedness under the subspace clustering scenario.
3.3 The stochastic setting
We further consider the case when data points are stochastically generated from some underlying
“true” subspace set C∗ = {S∗1 , · · · ,S∗k}. Such settings were extensively investigated in previous
development of subspace clustering algorithms [24, 25, 14]. Below we give precise definition of the
considered stochastic subspace clustering model:
The stochastic model For every cluster ` associated with subspace S∗` , a data point x(`)i ∈ Rd
belonging to cluster ` can be written as x(`)i = y
(`)
i + ε
(`)
i , where y
(`)
i is sampled uniformly at
random from {y ∈ S∗` : ‖y‖2 = 1} and εi ∼ N (0, σ2/d · Id) for some noise parameter σ.
Under the stochastic setting we consider the solver f to be the Threshold-based Subspace Clustering
(TSC, [14]) algorithm. A simplified version of TSC is presented in Alg. 2. An alternative idea is to
apply results in the previous section since the stochastic model implies well-separated dataset when
noise level σ is small. However, the running time of TSC is O(n2d), which is much more efficient
than core-set based methods. TSC is provably correct in that the similarity graph G has no false
connections and is connected per cluster, as shown in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.5 (Connectivity of TSC). Fix γ > 1 and assume max 0.04n` ≤ s ≤ minn`/6. If for
every ` ∈ {1, · · · , k}, the number of data points n` and the noise level σ satisfy
n`
log n`
>
γpi
√
2q(12pi)q−1
0.01(q/2− 1)(q − 1) ;
σ(1 + σ)√
log n
√
q√
d
≤ 1
15 log n
−
√
1−min
6`=`′
d2(S∗` ,S∗`′)
q
;
σ¯ <
√
d
24 log n
[
cos
(
12pi
(
γ
√
2piq log n`
n`
) 1
q−1
)
− cos
((
0.01(q/2− 1)(q − 1)√
pi
) 1
q−1
)]
,
where σ¯ = 2
√
5σ + σ2. Then with probability at least 1 − n2e−
√
d − n∑` e−n`/400 −∑
` n
1−γ
` /(γ log n`) − 12/n −
∑
` n`e
−c(n`−1), the connected components in G correspond ex-
actly to the k subspaces.
Conditions in Lemma 3.5 characterize the interaction between sample complexity n`, noise level
σ and “signal” level min` 6=`′ d(S∗` ,S∗`′). Theorem 3.6 is then a simple corollary of Lemma 3.5.
Complete proofs are deferred to Appendix C.
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Theorem 3.6 (Stability of TSC on stochastic data). Assume conditions in Lemma 3.5 hold with
respect to n′ = n/m for ω(log2 n) ≤ m ≤ o(n). Assume in addition that limn→∞ n` = ∞ for all
` = 1, · · · , L and the failure probability does not exceed 1/8. Then for every  > 0 we have
lim
n→∞PrXS
[
dW (Cˆ, C∗) > 
]
= 0. (9)
Compared to Theorem 3.4 for the agnostic model, Theorem 3.6 shows that one can achieve consis-
tent estimation of underlying subspaces under a stochastic model. It is an interesting question to
derive finite sample bounds for the differentially private TSC algorithm.
3.4 Discussion
It is worth noting that the sample-aggregate framework is an (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism
for any computational subroutine f . However, the utility claim (i.e., the O(r/ε) bound on each
coordinate of A(X ) − c) requires the stability of the particular subroutine f , as outlined in Eq.
(5). It is unfortunately hard to theoretically argue for stability of state-of-the-art subspace clustering
methods such as sparse subspace cluster (SSC, [11]) due to the “graph connectivity” issue [21]3.
Nevertheless, we observe satisfactory performance of SSC based algorithms in simulations (see
Sec. 5). It remains an open question to derive utility guarantee for (user) differentially private SSC.
4 Private subspace clustering via the exponential mechanism
In Section 3 we analyzed two algorithms with provable privacy and utility guarantees for sub-
space clustering based on the sample-aggregate framework. However, empirical evidence shows
that sample-aggregate based private clustering suffers from poor utility in practice [26]. In this sec-
tion, we propose a practical private subspace clustering algorithm based on the exponential mecha-
nism [18]. In particular, given the dataset X with n data points, we propose to samples parameters
θ = ({S`}k`=1, {zi}ni=1) where S` ∈ Sqd, zj ∈ {1, · · · , k} from the following distribution:
p(θ;X ) ∝ exp
(
−ε
2
·
n∑
i=1
d2(xi,Szi)
)
, (10)
where ε > 0 is the privacy parameter. The following proposition shows that exact sampling from
the distribution in Eq. (10) results in a provable differentially private algorithm. Its proof is trivial
and is deferred to Appendix D.1. Note that unlike sample-aggregate based methods, the exponential
mechanism can privately release clustering assignment z. This does not violate the lower bound in
[29] because the released clustering assignment z is not guaranteed to be exactly correct.
Proposition 4.1. The random algorithm A : X 7→ θ that outputs one sample from the distribution
defined in Eq. (10) is ε-differential private.
4.1 A Gibbs sampling implementation
It is hard in general to sample parameters from distributions as complicated as in Eq. (10). We
present a Gibbs sampler that iteratively samples subspaces {Si} and cluster assignments {zj} from
their conditional distributions.
Update of zi: When {S`} and z−i are fixed, the conditional distribution of zi is
p(zi|{S`}k`=1, z−i;X ) ∝ exp(−ε/2 · d2(xi,Szi)). (11)
Since d(xi,Szi) can be efficiently computed (given an orthonormal basis of Szi ), update of zi can
be easily done by sampling zj from a categorical distribution.
Update of S`: Let X˜ (`) = {xi ∈ X : zi = `} denote data points that are assigned to cluster ` and
n˜` = |X˜ (`)|. Denote X˜(`) ∈ Rd×n˜` as the matrix with columns corresponding to all data points in
X˜ (`). The distribution over S` conditioned on z can then be written as
p(S` = range(U`)|z;X ) ∝ exp(ε/2 · tr(U>` A`U`)); U` ∈ Rd×q,U>` U` = Iq×q, (12)
where A` = X˜(`)X˜(`)
>
is the unnormalized sample covariance matrix. Distribution of the form in
Eq. (12) is a special case of the matrix Bingham distribution, which admits a Gibbs sampler [16]. We
give implementation details in Appendix D.2 with modifications so that the resulting Gibbs sampler
is empirically more efficient for a wide range of parameter settings.
3Recently [28] established full clustering guarantee for SSC, however, under strong assumptions.
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4.2 Discussion
The proposed Gibbs sampler resembles the k-plane algorithm for subspace clustering [3]. It is
in fact a “probabilistic” version of k-plane since sampling is performed at each iteration rather
than deterministic updates. Furthermore, the proposed Gibbs sampler could be viewed as posterior
sampling for the following generative model: first sample U` uniformly at random from Sdq for
each subspace S`; afterwards, cluster assignments {zi}ni=1 are sampled such that Pr[zi = j] = 1/k
and xi is set as xi = U`yi + PU⊥` wi, where yi is sampled uniformly at random from the q-
dimensional unit ball and wi ∼ N (0, Id/ε). Connection between the above-mentioned generative
model and Gibbs sampler is formally justified in Appendix D.3. The generative model is strikingly
similar to the well-known mixtures of probabilistic PCA (MPPCA, [27]) model by setting variance
parameters σ` in MPPCA to
√
1/ε. The only difference is that yi are sampled uniformly at random
from a unit ball 4 and noisewi is constrained to U⊥` , the complement space of U`. Note that this is
closely related to earlier observation that “posterior sampling is private” [20, 6, 31], but different in
that we constructed a model from a private procedure rather than the other way round.
As the privacy parameter ε → ∞ (i.e., no privacy guarantee), we arrive immediately at the exact
k-plane algorithm and the posterior distribution concentrates around the optimal k-means solution
(C∗, z∗). This behavior is similar to what a small-variance asymptotic analysis on MPPCA models
reveals [30]. On the other hand, the proposed Gibbs sampler is significantly different from previous
Bayesian probabilisitic PCA formulation [34, 30] in that the subspaces are sampled from a matrix
Bingham distribution. Finally, we remark that the proposed Gibbs sampler is only asymptotically
private because Proposition 4.1 requires exact (or nearly exact [31]) sampling from Eq. (10).
5 Numerical results
We provide numerical results of both the sample-aggregate and Gibbs sampling algorithms on syn-
thetic and real-world datasets. We also compare with a baseline method implemented based on the
k-plane algorithm [3] with perturbed sample covariance matrix via the SuLQ framework [2] (de-
tails presented in Appendix E). Three solvers are considered for the sample-aggregate framework:
threshold-based subspace clustering (TSC, [14]), which has provable utility guarantee with sample-
aggregation on stochastic models, along with sparse subspace clustering (SSC, [11]) and low-rank
representation (LRR, [17]), the two state-of-the-art methods for subspace clustering. For Gibbs
sampling, we use non-private SSC and LRR solutions as initialization for the Gibbs sampler. All
methods are implemented using Matlab.
For synthetic datasets, we first generate k random q-dimensional linear subspaces. Each subspace is
generated by first sampling a d× q random Gaussian matrix and then recording its column space. n
data points are then assigned to one of the k subspaces (clusters) uniformly at random. To generate
a data point xi assigned with subspace S`, we first sample yi ∈ Rq with ‖yi‖2 = 1 uniformly
at random from the q-dimensional unit sphere. Afterwards, xi is set as xi = U`yi + wi, where
U` ∈ Rd×q is an orthonormal basis associated with S` and wi ∼ N (0, σ2Id) is a noise vector.
Figure 2 compares the utility (measured in terms of k-means objective cost(Cˆ;X ) and the Wasser-
stein’s distance dW (Cˆ, C∗)) of sample aggregation, Gibbs sampling and SuLQ subspace clustering.
As shown in the plots, sample-aggregation algorithms have poor utility unless the privacy parameter
ε is truly large (which means very little privacy protection). On the other hand, both Gibbs sampling
and SuLQ subspace clustering give reasonably good performance. Figure 2 also shows that SuLQ
scales poorly with the ambient dimension d. This is because SuLQ subspace clustering requires
calibrating noise to a d × d sample covariance matrix, which induces much error when d is large.
Gibbs sampling seems to be robust to various d settings.
We also experiment on real-world datasets. The right two plots in Figure 2 report utility on a sub-
set of the extended Yale Face Dataset B [13] for face clustering. 5 random individuals are picked,
forming a subset of the original dataset with n = 320 data points (images). The dataset is prepro-
cessed by projecting each individual onto a 9D affine subspace via PCA. Such preprocessing step
was adopted in [32, 29] and was theoretically justified in [1]. Afterwards, ambient dimension of
the entire dataset is reduced to d = 50 by random Gaussian projection. The plots show that Gibbs
sampling significantly outperforms the other algorithms.
4In MPPCA latent variables yi are sampled from a normal distributionN (0, ρ2Iq).
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Figure 2: Utility under fixed privacy budget ε. Top row shows k-means cost and bottom row shows
the Wasserstein’s distance dW (Cˆ, C∗). From left to right: synthetic dataset, n = 5000, d = 5, k =
3, q = 3, σ = 0.01; n = 1000, d = 10, k = 3, q = 3, σ = 0.1; extended Yale Face Dataset B
(a subset). n = 320, d = 50, k = 5, q = 9, σ = 0.01. δ is set to 1/(n lnn) for (ε, δ)-privacy
algorithms. “s.a.” stands for smooth sensitivity and “exp.” stands for exponential mechanism.
“SuLQ-10” and “SuLQ-50” stand for the SuLQ framework performing 10 and 50 iterations. Gibbs
sampling is run for 10000 iterations and the mean of the last 100 samples is reported.
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Figure 3: Test statistics, k-means cost and dW (Cˆ, C∗) of 8 trials of the Gibbs sampler under different
privacy settings. Synthetic dataset setting: n = 1000, d = 10, k = 3, q = 3, σ = 0.1.
In Figure 3 we investigate the mixing behavior of proposed Gibbs sampler. We plot for multiple
trials of Gibbs sampling the k-means objective, Wasserstein’s distance and a test statistic 1/
√
kq ·
(
∑k
`=1 ‖1/T ·
∑T
t=1 U
(t)
` ‖2F )1/2, where U(t)` is a basis sample of S` at the tth iteration. The test
statistic has mean zero under distribution in Eq. (10) and a similar statistic was used in [4] as a
diagnostic of the mixing behavior of another Gibbs sampler. Figure 3 shows that under various
privacy parameter settings, the proposed Gibbs sampler mixes quite well after 10000 iterations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we consider subspace clustering subject to formal differential privacy constraints. We
analyzed two sample-aggregate based algorithms with provable utility guarantees under agnostic and
stochastic data models. We also propose a Gibbs sampling subspace clustering algorithm based on
the exponential mechanism that works well in practice. Some interesting future directions include
utility bounds for state-of-the-art subspace clustering algorithms like SSC or LRR.
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Appendix A Some basic properties regarding the distances
Proposition A.1. Let S1,S2,S3 ∈ Sdq be three q-dimensional subspaces. Then d(S1,S3) ≤
d(S1,S2) + d(S2, S3) and d2(S1,S3) ≤ 2(d2(S1,S2) + d2(S2,S3)).
Proof. Let U1,U2,U3 ∈ Rd×q be orthonormal basis associated with S1,S2 and S3. We then have
d(S1,S3) = ‖U1U>1 −U3U>3 ‖F ≤ ‖U1U>1 −U2U>2 ‖F + ‖U2U>2 −U3U>3 ‖F = d(S1,S2) +
d(S2,S3). The other inequality holds due to the fact that ‖U1U>1 − U3U>3 ‖2F ≤ 2(‖U1U>1 −
U2U
>
2 ‖2F + ‖U2U>2 −U3U>3 ‖2F ).
Proposition A.2. For any x ∈ Rd and S,S ′ ∈ Sdq , we have d(x,S ′) ≤ d(x,S) + d(S,S ′) and
d2(x,S ′) ≤ 2(d2(x,S) + d2(S,S ′)).
Proof. By definition, d(x,S ′) = ‖x − PS′(x)‖2 ≤ ‖x − PS′(PS(x))‖2 ≤ ‖x − PS(x)‖2 +
‖PS(x) − PS′(PS(x))‖2 ≤ d(x,S) + supy∈S,‖y‖2≤1 ‖y − PS′(y)‖2. Note also that
supy∈S,‖y‖2≤1 ‖y−PS′(y)‖2 ≤ supy∈S,‖y‖2≤1 ‖UU>y −U′U′>y‖2 ≤ ‖UU>−U′U′>‖2 ≤
d(S,S ′). Here U and U ′ are orthonormal basis associated with S and S ′. Therefore, d(x,S ′) ≤
d(x,S) + d(S,S ′). The other inequality follows by the same argument.
Proposition A.3. Fix S ∈ Sdq and let U ∈ Rd×q be an orthonormal basis associated with S.
Suppose U′ = U + E and S ′ = range(U′). Then d(S,S ′) ≤ √2‖E‖F .
Proof. Apply Wedin’s Theorem (Theorem F.2 in Appendix F) and note that σq(U) = 1.
Appendix B Proofs of sample-aggregate private subspace clustering: the
agnostic case
The main objective of this section is to prove Theorem 3.4 for differentially private subspace clus-
tering under the fully agnostic setting. The theorem is a simple consequence of Lemma 3.3 in the
main text and the following lemma:
Lemma B.1. Fix γ > 0. Suppose XS contains m = Ω(kqd log(qd/γ)γ2 ) data points subsampled
from X uniformly at random without replacement. Then with probability at least 3/4 over random
samples U , the following holds uniformly for all candidate subspace sets C:
cost(C;XS) ≤ 2cost(C;X ) + γ. (13)
B.1 Proof of Lemma B.1
Lemma B.2 ([39]). Fix X and f : X → [0,M ] for some positive constant M > 0. Let XS be
a subset of X with t elements, each drawn uniformly at random from X without replacement. Let
, δ > 0. Then Pr[|EX [f(x)]− EXS [f(x)]| ≥ ] ≤ δ when t ≥ M
2 ln(2/δ)
22 .
Corollary B.3. Fix X and a finite set of functions F , where 0 ≤ f(x) ≤ M for every x ∈ X
and f ∈ F . Let XS be a subset of X with m elements, each drawn uniformly at random from X
without replacement. Let , δ > 0. Then Pr[∃f ∈ F , |EX [f(x)] − EXS [f(x)]| ≥ ] ≤ δ when
m ≥ M2 ln(2|F|/δ)22 .
Proof. Apply Lemma B.2 and use union bound over all f ∈ F .
Lemma B.4. Fix  > 0. There exists S ⊆ Sdq with |S| = O((qd)qd/2/qd) such that for any S ∈ Sdq ,
minS′∈S d(S,S ′) ≤ .
Proof. By a standard convering number argument, there exists L ⊆ Rd with |L| = O((√d/)d)
such that for any x ∈ Rd, ‖x‖2 ≤ 1, we have minx′∈L ‖x − x′‖2 ≤ . Consequently, there exists
Lq ⊆ Rd×q with |Lq| = O((qd)qd/2/qd) such that for any U ∈ Rd×q with unit column norms,
minU′∈Lq ‖U−U′‖F ≤ . Proposition A.3 then yields the lemma.
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We are now ready to prove Lemma B.1.
Proof of Lemma B.1. Suppose S is a finite subset of Sdq such that for every S ∈ Sdq ,
minS′∈S d2(S,S ′) ≤ γ/4. By Lemma B.4, there exists such S with |S| = O((qd/γ)qd/2). Let
X be the set of data points and F = {f(·; C)|C = {S1, · · · ,Sk} ⊆ S}, where f(x; C) =
minkj=1 d
2(x,Sj). By definition, EX [f(x; C)] = cost(C;X ) and |F| = O((qd/γ)kqd/2). Sub-
sequently, applying Corollary B.3 we obtain
Pr
XS
[
∀C ⊆ S, ∣∣cost(C;XS)− cost(C;X )∣∣ ≤ γ
2
]
≥ 3
4
whenever |XS | = Ω(kqd log(qd/γ)γ2 ). Consequently, applying Proposition A.2 we have
Pr
XS
[∀C ⊆ Sdq , cost(C;XS) ≤ 2cost(C;X ) + γ] ≥ 34 .
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3
We first define some notations that will be used in the proof. Throughout the section we assume
the dataset X is (φ, η, ψ)-well separated. Let Xi = {x ∈ X : d(x,S∗i ) ≤ d(x,S∗j ),∀j} denote
the collection of all data points in X that are clustered to the cluster corresponding to S∗i . Define
ni = |Xi|. By definition,
∑k
i=1 ni = n. Define r
2
i = ∆
2
1(Xi), Di = minj 6=i d(S∗i ,S∗j ) and
d2i = φ
2n∆2k−1(X )/ni. Let X cori = {x ∈ Xi : d(x,S∗i )2 ≤ r
2
i
ρ } for some parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition B.5. r2i ≤ d2i ≤ 2φ
2
1−2φ2D
2
i .
Proof. Since X is well-separated we have d2i = φ2∆2k−1(X ) · n/ni ≥ ∆2k(X ) · n/ni ≥
1
ni
∑
x∈Xi d(x,S∗i )2 ≥ ∆21(Xi) = r2i . Hence the first inequality.
For the second inequality, we only need to prove that (1 − 2φ2)n∆2k−1(X ) ≤ 2niD2i . By well-
separatedness (1− 2φ2)n∆2k−1(X ) = n(∆2k−1(X )− 2∆2k(X )). On the other hand, by diverting all
points in X ∗i into the cluster associated with S∗j with d(S∗i ,S∗j ) = Di, we have
n∆2k−1(X ) ≤
∑
6`=i
∑
x∈X`
d2(x,S∗` ) +
∑
x∈Xi
d2(x,S∗j )
≤
∑
6`=i
∑
x∈X`
d2(x,S∗` ) + 2
∑
x∈Xi
d2(x,S∗j ) + 2nid2(S∗i ,S∗j )
≤ 2n∆2k(X ) + 2niD2i .
Rearranging the terms we get n(∆2k−1(X )− 2∆2k(X )) ≤ 2niD2i .
Proposition B.6. For any ρ ∈ (0, 1), |X cori | ≥ (1− ρ)|Xi| = (1− ρ)ni.
Proof. By definition r2i =
1
ni
∑
x∈Xi d
2(x,S∗i ) = E[T ], where T is the random variable of
d2(x,S∗i ) for a vector chosen from Xi uniformly at random. By Markov’s inequality, Pr[T >
r2i
ρ ] ≤ ρ and hence |X cori | = ni Pr[T ≤ r
2
i
ρ ] ≥ (1− ρ)ni.
Lemma B.7. Suppose cost(Cˆ;X ) ≤ α∆2k(X ) for some α < 1−802φ
2
800 . Then there exists a permuta-
tion pi : [k]→ [k] such that d(Sˆi,S∗pi(i)) ≤ Di/10 for every i = 1, · · · , k.
Proof. Pick ρ = 800φ
2
1−2φ2 . By conditions on α we have α ≤ ( 1ρ − 1)φ2. In the remainder of the proof
we show that for every i ∈ [k], there exists some j ∈ [k] such that d(S∗i , Sˆj) ≤ 2di√ρ ≤ Di/10, where
the last inequality is due to Proposition B.5 and the choice of ρ. This is sufficient for the conclusion
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in Lemma B.7 since no two subspaces S∗i and S∗i′ can be within the range of Di/10 to the same
subspace Sˆj due to the definition of Di and triangle inequality presented in Proposition A.1.
Assume by way of contradiction that there exists i ∈ [k] such that d(S∗i , Sˆj) > 2di√ρ . This implies
that any point in X cori = {x ∈ Xi : d(x,S∗i ) ≤ ri√ρ} is at least di√ρ away from any subspace in Cˆ,
due to di ≥ ri and the triangle inequality. Therefore, cost(Cˆ;X ) ≥ |X
cor
i |
n
d2i
ρ ≥ ( 1ρ − 1)nin d2i , where
the last inequality is due to Proposition B.6. Finally, ( 1ρ − 1)nin d2i = ( 1ρ − 1)nin · φ2n∆2k−1(X ) >
αni∆
2
k−1(X ) ≥ α∆2k−1(X ), and hence the contradiction.
Lemma B.8. Fix a candidate subspace set Cˆ = {Sˆ1, · · · , Sˆ2}. Define Rˆi = {x ∈ X : d(x, Sˆi) ≤
d(x, Sˆj) + Dˆi/4,∀j}, where Dˆi = minj 6=i d(Sˆi, Sˆj). Suppose there exists a permutation pi : [k]→
[k] such that d(Sˆi,S∗pi(i)) ≤ Dpi(i)/10 for every i, where Di = minj 6=i d(S∗i ,S∗j ). Then we have
Xpi(i) ⊆ Rˆi and further more |Xpi(i)| ≥ β|Rˆi| for β = 1−2φ
2
1+48φ2 .
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume pi(i) = i; that is, d(Sˆi,S∗i ) ≤ Di/10 for every i =
1, · · · , k. By triangle inequality in Proposition A.1, we have 45Di ≤ Dˆi ≤ 65Di. Fix an arbitrary
x ∈ Xi. By definition, d(x,S∗i ) ≤ d(x,S∗j ). Therefore, d(x, Sˆi) ≤ d(x,S∗i ) + Di10 ≤ d(x,S∗j ) +
Di
10 ≤ d(x, Sˆj) + Di5 ≤ d(x, Sˆj) + Dˆi4 . Therefore, Xi ⊆ Rˆi.
We next prove that |Xi| ≥ β|Rˆi|. The approach we take is to assume |Xi| = β|Rˆi| for some real
number β and show that β ≥ 1−2φ21+48φ2 . Let aj = |Rˆi∩Xj ||Rˆi| and we arbitrarily assign
ajni
1−ai points in Xi
to the cluster associated with subpace S∗j . This will clear the S∗i subspace since
∑
j 6=i
ajni
1−ai = ni.
As a result, we have
n∆2k−1(X ) ≤ n∆2k(X )− ni∆1(Xi) +
∑
x∈Xi
d2(x,S∗j )
≤ n∆2k(X ) + ni∆1(Xi) + 2
∑
j 6=i
ajni
1− ai · d
2(S∗i ,S∗j )
≤ 2n∆2k(X ) +
2β
1− β
∑
j 6=i
aj |Rˆi|d2(S∗i ,S∗j ).
The last inequality is due to the fact that niai =
|Xi|·|Rˆi|
|Xi∩Rˆi| = |Rˆi| and
ai
1−ai =
|Xi|
|Rˆi|−|Xi| ≤
β
1−β .
On the other hand, for any y ∈ Xj∩Rˆi, one has d(y,S∗i ) ≤ d(y, Sˆi)+ Di10 ≤ d(y, Sˆj)+ Di5 + Di10 ≤
d(y,S∗j ) + 310 (Di+Dj). Consequently, d(S∗i ,S∗j ) ≤ d(y,S∗i ) +d(y,S∗j ) ≤ 2d(y,S∗j ) + 310 (Di+
Dj) ≤ 2d(y,S∗j ) + 35d(S∗i ,S∗j ) and hence d(S∗i ,S∗j ) ≤ 5d(y,S∗j ). Subsequently,
n∆2k−1(X ) ≤ 2n∆2k(X ) +
2β
1− β
∑
j 6=i
aj |Rˆi|d2(S∗i ,S∗j )
= 2n∆2k(X ) +
2β
1− β
∑
j 6=i
|Rˆi ∩ Xj |d2(S∗i ,S∗j )
≤ 2n∆2k(X ) +
50β
1− β
∑
j 6=i
∑
y∈Rˆi∩Xj
d2(y,S∗j )
≤ 2n∆2k(X ) +
50β
1− β · n∆
2
k(X ).
By the well-separatedness of X , we have
∆2k(X ) ≤ φ2∆2k−1(X ) ≤
(
2 +
50β
1− β
)
φ2∆2k(X ).
Therefore, 2 + 50β1−β ≥ 1/φ2, which implies β ≥ 1−2φ
2
1+48φ2 .
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Lemma B.9. Assume φ ≤ 1/2. Fix a candidate subspace set Cˆ = {Sˆ1, · · · , Sˆn}. Let Xˆi = {x ∈
X : d(x, Sˆi) ≤ d(x, Sˆj),∀j} denote the set of all data points that are clustered into Sˆi. Suppose
d(Sˆi,S∗i ) ≤ Di/10 for every i. Then |Xˆi4Xi| ≤ 150φ2|Xi|, where 4 denotes the symmetric
difference operator between two sets.
Proof. We first derive a lower bound on |Xˆi ∩ Xi|. We first claim that for any x ∈ X , d(x,S∗i ) ≤
2
5Di yields x ∈ Xˆi. To see this, note that d(x, Sˆi) ≤ d(x,S∗i ) + d(S∗i , Sˆi) ≤ 25Di + 110Di = 12Di
and for every j 6= i, d(x, Sˆj) ≥ d(S∗i , Sˆj) − d(x,S∗i ) ≥ 910Di − 25Di = 12Di. Therefore,
d(x, Sˆi) ≤ d(x, Sˆj) for every j 6= i.
On the other hand, by Proposition B.5 d(x,S∗i ) ≤ ri√ρ′ with ρ′ = 25φ
2
2(1−2φ2) implies d(x,S∗i ) ≤ 25Di.
Consequently, by Proposition B.6 we have |Xˆi ∩Xi| ≥ |{x ∈ Xi : d(x,S∗i ) ≤ ri√ρ′ | ≥ (1− ρ′)|Xi|.
In addition, Lemma B.8 asserts that |Xi| ≥ β|Rˆi| ≥ β|Xi|. Therefore, |Xˆi4Xi| ≤ (2ρ′ + 1β −
1)|Xi| ≤ 75φ
2
1−2φ2 |Xi| ≤ 150φ2Xi, assuming φ ≤ 12 .
Proposition B.10. Let σq(Xi) denote the qth largest singular value of Xi. We then have σ2q (Xi) ≥
nψ and σ2q+1(Xi) ≤ nη.
Proof. By principal component analysis, n∆2k(X ) =
∑k
i=1
∑
p≥q+1 σ
2
p(Xi). Therefore,
n∆2k,−1(X ) ≤ n∆2k(X ) + σ2q (Xi) for any i. Since X is (φ, η, ψ)-well separated, we have
n∆2k,−1 ≥ n∆2k + nψ. Consequently, σ2q (Xi) ≥ nψ. On the other hand, we have n∆2k,+1(X ) ≤
n∆2k(X )− σ2q+1(Xi) for any i and n∆2k,+1(X ) ≥ n∆2k − nη. Hence σ2q+1(Xi) ≤ nη.
Lemma B.11. Following the same notations in Lemma B.11. Suppose φ2 < 1/150. If |Xˆi4Xi| ≤
150φ2|Xi| holds for every i, then d(S∗i , Sˆi) ≤ 600
√
2φ2
(1−150φ2)(ψ−η) .
Proof. Let Bi = Xi ∩ Xˆi, Yi = Xi\Bi and Zi = Xˆi\Bi. Since |Xˆi4Xi| ≤ 150φ2|Xi|, we have
|Bi| ≥ (1 − 150φ2)|Xi| and |Yi|, |Zi| ≤ 150φ2|Xi|. Let Bi,Yi,Zi be the matrices associated
with Bi,Yi and Zi. Define Ai = BiB
>
i +YiY
>
i
|Bi|+|Yi| and A˜i =
BiB
>
i +ZiZ
>
i
|Bi|+|Zi| . By principal component
analysis, S∗i and Sˆi are the span of top-q eigenvectors associated with Ai and A˜i. By Wedin’s
Theorem (Theorem F.2 in Appendix F), the distance d(S∗i , Sˆi) can be bounded by upper bounding
the perturbation between Ai and A˜i, for example, ‖Ai − A˜i‖F .
Define A¯i =
BiB
>
i
|Bi| and consider separately ‖Ai − A¯i‖F and ‖A˜i − A¯i‖F . By definition, we have
‖Ai − A¯i‖F =
∥∥∥∥BiB>i|Bi| − BiB
>
i + YiY
>
i
|Bi|+ |Yi|
∥∥∥∥
F
≤
∥∥∥∥( 1|Bi| − 1|Bi|+ |Yi|
)
BiB
>
i
∥∥∥∥
F
+
∥∥∥∥ YiY>i|Bi|+ |Yi|
∥∥∥∥
F
≤ |Yi| · ‖Bi‖
2
F
|Bi|(|Bi|+ |Yi|) +
‖Yi‖2F
|Bi|+ |Yi|
≤ |Yi| · |Bi||Bi|(|Bi|+ |Yi|) +
|Yi|
|Bi|+ |Yi|
=
2|Yi|
|Bi|+ |Yi| ≤
300φ2
1− 150φ2 .
Using essentially the same line of argument one can show ‖A˜i − A¯i‖F ≤ 300φ
2
1−150φ2 as well. There-
fore, ‖Ai − A˜i‖F ≤ 600φ
2
1−150φ2 . Applying Wedin’s Theorem and Proposition B.10 we get
d(S∗i , Sˆi) ≤
√
2‖Ai − A˜i‖F
σq(Ai)− σq+1(Ai) ≤
√
2|Xi|‖Ai − A˜i‖F
σ2q (Xi)− σ2q+1(Xi)
≤
√
2|Xi|‖Ai − A˜i‖F
n(ψ − η) ≤
600
√
2φ2
(1− 150φ2)(ψ − η) .
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Combining Lemma B.7 to B.11 we arrive at a proof of the key lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Given a < 1−802φ
2
800φ2 and X being (φ, η, ψ)-well separated, we have
cost(Cˆ;X ) ≤ α∆2k−1(X ) for some α < 1−802φ
2
800 . By Lemma B.7, d(S∗i , Sˆi) ≤ Di/10 hold
for every i = 1, · · · , k, after possible rearrangement of {Sˆi}ki=1. Applying Lemma B.8, B.9
and B.11 we obtain d(S∗i , Sˆi) ≤ 600
√
2φ2
(1−150φ2)(ψ−η) . Finally, dW (Cˆ, C∗) ≤
√
kmaxi d(S∗i , Sˆi) ≤
600
√
2φ2
√
k
(1−150φ2)(ψ−η) .
Appendix C Proofs of sample-aggregate private subspace clustering: the
stochastic case
In this section we prove Theorem 3.6 that details a stability result for threshold-based subspace
clustering under the stochastic datasetting. We first cite the following lemma from [14] which states
that (under certain separation conditions) with high probability the similarity graph G recovered by
the robust TSC algorithm has no false connections; that is, two data points i and j are connected in
G only if they belong to the same cluster (subspace).
Lemma C.1 ([14], Theorem 3; no false connection of TSC). Suppose s ≤ minn`/6 and√
1−min
6`=`′
d2(S∗` ,S∗`′)
q
+
σ(1 + σ)√
log n
√
q√
d
≤ 1
15 log n
(14)
with d ≥ 6 log n; then the similarity graph G constructed by Algorithm 2 has no false connections
with probability at least 1− 10n −
∑
` n`e
−c(n`−1) for some absolute constant c > 0.
Based on Lemma C.1, to prove Lemma 3.5 it remains to show that data points within the same
cluster are indeed connected in the similarity graph G. The proof is presented in Appendix C.1.
With Lemma C.1 and 3.5, Theorem 3.6 can be easily proved as follows:
Proof of Theorem 3.6. By Lemma C.1 and 3.5, we know that under the stated conditions the simi-
larity graph G output by the TSC algorithm has no false connections and is connected per cluster.
Fix a cluster ` and consider the observed data points X(`) = Y(`) +E(`). Since both the signal Y(`)
and the noise E(`) are stochastic, by standard analysis of PCA one can show that the top-q subspace
of X(`) converges to the underlying subspace S∗` in probability as the number of data points n` goes
to infinity [43]. The theorem then holds because m = o(n) and hence n′ = n/m→∞.
C.1 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proposition C.2. Suppose yi = xi + εi with εi ∼ N (0, σ
2
d Id) and σ > 0. Then with probability
at least 1− n2e−
√
d − 2/n the following holds:
∣∣〈yi,yj〉 − 〈xi,xj〉∣∣ ≤ (2√5σ + 5σ2)√6 log nd ; ∀i, j ∈ {1, · · · , n}, i 6= j. (15)
Proof. Applying Theorem F.3 (in Appendix F) and set t = 4 and ρ =
√
6 log n/d in Theorem F.3.
Applying also the union bound over all (i, j) ∈ {1, · · · , n} pairs with i 6= j. Then the following
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holds uniformly for all i 6= j with probability at least 1− n2e−d − 2/n:
‖εi‖2 ≤
√
5σ;∣∣〈εi,xj〉∣∣ ≤ √5σ ·√6 log n
d
, ∀i, j;
∣∣〈εi, εj〉∣∣ ≤ 5σ2 ·√6 log n
d
, ∀i 6= j.
The proof is then completed by noting that∣∣〈yi,yj〉 − 〈xi,xj〉∣∣ ≤ ∣∣〈εi,xj〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈εj ,xi〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈εi, εj〉∣∣
≤ (2
√
5σ + 5σ2)
√
6 log n
d
.
Lemma C.3 ([14], Lemma 3; extracted from the proof of Lemma 6.2. in [42]). Let Sd−1 = {x ∈
Rd : ‖x‖2 = 1} denote the d-dimensional unit sphere. For an arbitrary p ∈ Sd−1, defineC(p, θ) =
{q ∈ Sd−1 : ϑ(p, q) ≤ θ} where ϑ(p, q) = arccos(〈p, q〉) is the angle between p and q. Let L(·)
denote the Lebesgue area of a region and Θ(·) be the inverse function of L(C(p, θ)) with respect to
θ. Then for each d ≥ 1 and M ≥ 1, there exists a partition R1, · · · , RM of the unit sphere Sd−1
such that 5 supx,y∈Rm ϑ(x,y) ≤ θ∗ for every m = 1, · · · ,M . Here θ∗ = 8Θ(L(Sd−1)/M).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.5.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. By Lemma C.1 we already know that the similarity graph G has no false
connections. Fix a cluster ` ∈ {1, · · · , k}. Let x(`)i = U(`)a(`)i where a(`)i ∈ Sq−1. Set
M = n`/(γ log n`) and let R1, · · · , RM be a partition of the unit sphere Sq−1 as characterized
in Lemma C.3. Here q is the intrinsic rank of an underlying subspace. We need to prove the fol-
lowing two properties hold with high probability: (A) every region Rm contains at least one point
in A(`) = {a(`)i }n`i=1; (B) for every a(`)i , all data points a(`)j belonging to the neighboring region of
the region containing a(`)i are connected with a
(`)
i .
Property (A) is easy to prove. By union bound, the probability that some region is empty can be
upper bounded by
M
(
1− 1
M
)n`
≤Me−n`/M = n
1−γ
`
γ log n`
.
We next turn to prove Property (B). Unlike the noiseless case, the s-nearest-neighbor graph is com-
puted based on the noise-perturbed data points {yi}ni=1. It is no longer true that data points belong-
ing to neighboring regions have larger inner products compared to data points that do not belong
to the same or neighboring regions. Hence, we adopt a different argument from the one presented
in [14]. Instead of showing that |C(x(`)i , 3θ∗)| ≤ s˜ = s/2, we show that |C(a(`)i , rθ∗)| ≤ s˜
for some r  3 and in addition |〈y(`)j ,y(`)i 〉| > |〈y(`)j′ ,y(`)i 〉| for every a(`)j /∈ C(a(`)i , rθ∗) and
a
(`)
j′ ∈ C(x(`)i , 3θ∗). 6 This guarantees that all points in C(a(`)i , 3θ∗) are connected to y(`)i in the
s-nearest-neighbor graph.
Fix a(`)i ∈ A(`) and set r such that
rθ∗ =
(
0.01(q/2− 1)(q − 1)√
pi
) 1
q−1
. (16)
5By definition R1 ∪ · · · ∪RM = Sd−1 and Ri ∩Rj = ∅ for i 6= j.
6Note that |〈y,y(`)i 〉| = |〈−y,y(`)i 〉| by symmetry. So a point far from y(`)i could have large inner product
and be connected with y(`)i . We take s˜ = s/2 to avoid this issue.
15
Define p = L(C(a(`)i , rθ∗))/L(Sq−1), where θ∗ is given in Lemma C.3. By definition,
E[|C(a(`)i , rθ∗)|] = pn`. Note that by symmetry p does not depend on a(`)i . Set s¯ = (0.01 + p)n`.
We then have
s¯
n`
= 0.01+
L(C(a(`)i , rθ∗))
L(Sq−1)
≤ 0.01+ L(S
q−2)(rθ∗)q−1
L(Sq−1)(q − 1) ≤ 0.01+
√
piΓ( q−12 )(rθ
∗)q−1
Γ( q2 )(q − 1)
≤ 0.02.
(17)
The second inequality is an application of Eq. (5.2) in [42] and the last inequality is due to Eq. (16).
On the other hand, by tail bounds of binomial distribution (Theorem 1 in [41]) we have
Pr
[∣∣C(a(`)i , rθ∗)∣∣ > n`(p+ 0.01)] ≤ e− 0.012n2`2(pn`+0.01n`/3) ≤ e− n`400 , (18)
where in the last inequality we used the fact that pn` ≤ 0.01n`. Since s¯ ≤ 0.02n` ≤ s˜, we
proved that with probability at least 1− e− n`400 there will be no more than s˜ data points contained in
C(a
(`)
i , rθ
∗).
The final step of the proof is to show that |〈y(`)j ,y(`)i 〉| > |〈y(`)j′ ,y(`)j 〉| for every a(`)j /∈ C(a(`)i , rθ∗)
and a(`)j′ ∈ C(x(`)i , 3θ∗). By Proposition C.2, we have with probability at least 1− ne−
√
d
∣∣〈y(`)j ,y(`)i 〉∣∣ ≤ ∣∣〈a(`)j ,a(`)i 〉∣∣+ (2√5σ + 5σ2)
√
6 log n
d
≤ cos(rθ∗) + (2
√
5σ + 5σ2)
√
6 log n
d
(19)
and∣∣〈y(`)j′ ,y(`)i 〉∣∣ ≥ ∣∣〈a(`)j′ ,a(`)i 〉∣∣− (2√5σ + 5σ2)
√
6 log n
d
≥ cos(3θ∗)− (2
√
5σ + 5σ2)
√
6 log n
d
.
(20)
Since rθ∗ is dictated in Eq. (16), we only need to obtain an upper bound on θ∗. Following the same
argument on page 25 in [14] we have
θ∗ ≤ 4pi
(√
2piq
M
) 1
q−1
= 4pi
(
γ
√
2piq log n`
n`
) 1
q−1
. (21)
Consequently, |〈y(`)j ,y(`)i 〉| > |〈y(`)j′ ,y(`)j 〉| when σ¯ = 2
√
5σ + 5σ2 satisfies
σ¯ <
√
d
24 log n
[
cos
(
12pi
(
γ
√
2piq log n`
n`
) 1
q−1
)
− cos
((
0.01(q/2− 1)(q − 1)√
pi
) 1
q−1
)]
.
(22)
The right-hand side of the above condition is strictly positive if n` satisfies
n` >
γpi
√
2q log n`
0.01(q/2− 1)(q − 1) · (12pi)
q−1.
Appendix D Supplementary materials for private subspace clustering via
the exponential mechanism
D.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. Define the score function h(·;θ) as h(X ;θ) = ∑ni=1 d2(xi,Szi). Since ‖xi‖2 ≤
1, it is straightforward that h(·;θ) has global sensitivity upper bounded by 1; that is,
supd(X ,X ′)=1 |h(X ;θ) − h(X ′;θ)| ≤ 1 for all θ. Eq. (10) is then a direct application of the
exponential mechanism.
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Algorithm 3 Gibbs sampling for matrix Bingham distribution (Eq. (23))
1: Input: symmetric matrix A, diagonal matrix B, current sample U, dimensions d and q.
2: for each r ∈ {1, · · · , q} in random order do
3: Let U(r) ∈ Rd be the rth column of U and U(−r) be the matrix excluding U(r).
4: Let N be an orthonormal basis of the null space of U(−r).
5: Compute z = N>U(r) and A˜ = BrrN>AN.
6: Update z by Gibbs sampling from the vector Bingham distributrion with parameter A˜.
7: Set U(r) = Nz.
8: end for
9: Output: the updated sample U.
Algorithm 4 Gibbs sampling for vector Bingham distribution (Eq. (24))
1: Input: symmetric matrix A, current sample x, dimension d.
2: Let A = EΛE>, Λ = diag(λ) be the eigen-decomposition of A. Compute y = E>x.
3: for each j ∈ {1, · · · , d} in random order do
4: Compute q1, · · · , qd as y21/(1− y2i ), · · · , y2d/(1− y2i ).
5: Sample θ ∈ (0, 1) from the density p(θ) ∝ e(λi−q>−iλ−i)θ × θ−1/2(1− θ)(d−3)/2.
6: Set s = +1 or −1 with equal probability.
7: Set yi = siθ1/2 and for each j 6= i set y2j = (1− θ)qj , leaving the sign unchanged.
8: end for
9: Output: the updated sample x = Ey.
D.2 Gibbs sampling for matrix Bingham distribution
In this section we give details of a Gibbs sampler proposed in [16] for sampling from a matrix
Bingham distribution. One component in the Gibbs sampler (the rejection sampling step) is slightly
modified to make the sampling more efficient.
The objective is to sample from the following matrix-Bingham distribution:
p(U; A,B) ∝ exp(tr(BU>AU)), (23)
where U is a d×q matrix lying on a Stiefel manifold; that is, U>U = Iq×q . In our problem A is an
unnormalized sample covariance matrix and B = εIq×q , with ε the privacy budget. As a simplified
case, when q = 1 we arrive at a vector version of the Bingham distribution:
p(x; A) ∝ exp(x>Ax), (24)
with x constrained on the d-dimensional sphere {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖2 = 1}. Gibbs samplers for both
Eq. (23) and (24) were proposed in [16] and presented in Algorithm 3 and 4.
In Algorithm 4, step 4 requires sampling from a non-standard 1-dimensional distribution
p(x; k, a) ∝ x−1/2(1− x)keax · 10<x<1 =: f(x). (25)
In [16] a rejection sampling algorithm was proposed to sample x from Eq. (25), with a Beta(1/2, 1+
min(k,max(k−a,−1/2))) envelope distribution. However, such a distribution is highly inefficient
when |a|  0 for which no Beta distribution serves as a good envelope distribution. To address this
problem, we propose two separate rejection sampling schemes for Eq. (25) when |a|  0.
Case 1: a  0 In this case, the mass of the distribution will concentrate on x → 0. We use
Gamma distribution Γ(1/2, 1/|a|) truncated on (0, 1) as an envelope distribution. That is, x ∼ g(·)
and g(·) is defined as
g(x) =
1
Z
· x−1/2eax · 10<x<1,
with Z a normalization constant. The constant M = supx f(x)/g(x) can be computed as
M = Z · sup
0<x<1
x−1/2(1− x)keax
x−1/2eax
≤ Z.
The step-by-step algorithm is as follows:
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1. Sample x ∼ Γ(1/2, 1/|a|). If x ≥ 1, throw away x and re-draw the sample.
2. Sample u ∈ (0, 1) from the uniform distribution over (0, 1).
3. If u ≤ (1− x)k, accept the sample; otherwise reject the sample and try again.
The proposed rejection sampling algorithm is efficient because when a  0, the envelope distribu-
tion g has very high density over the region near zero; consequently, (1 − x)k is close to one and
hence the acceptance rate is high.
Case 2: a 0 In this case, the mass of the distribution will concentrate on x→ 1. However, we
have a singularity at x = 0 (i.e., limx→0 f(x) =∞). This makes the sampling particularly difficult
as a distribution proportional to eax will be infinitely off at the region near zero. To circumvent
the problem, we propose a mixture distribution as the envelope, which have good approximation
property at both regions near 0 and 1.
First define density h as
h(x) =
1
Z
· (1− x)keax · 10<x<1,
where Z =
∫ 1
0
(1− x)keaxdx is the normalization constant. Note that samples from h(·) can be
obtained by first sampling z from a Gamma distribution Γ(k + 1, 1/a) truncated on (0, 1) and then
apply transform of variable x = 1− z. The density of the envelope distribution g(·) is then defined
as a mixture distribution:
g(x) =
1
Z
· Beta(x; 1/2, k + 1) +
(
1− 1
Z
)
· h(x).
The constant M = sup f(x)/g(x) can be computed by
M = max
(
sup
0<x≤1/a
f(x)
g(x)
, sup
1/a<x<1
f(x)
g(x)
)
≤ max
(
Z · sup
0<x≤1/a
x−1/2(1− x)keax ·B(1/2, k + 1)
x−1/2(1− x)k , 2 · sup1/a<x<1
x−1/2(1− x)keax
(1− x)keax
)
≤ Z ·max(2√a, eB(1/2, k + 1)).
Here for the second inequality we applyZ ≥ 2 for reasonably large a andB(·, ·) is the Beta function.
The normalization constant Z can be approximately computed using numerical integration. How-
ever, empirical evidence suggests that Z is huge for large a values (e.g., Z > 10100 if a > k+ 500).
Therefore, we could simply take Z → ∞, which simplifies the rejection sampling algorithm as
follows:
1. Sample z ∼ Γ(k + 1, 1/a). If z ≥ 1 then throw away z and re-draw the sample.
2. Compute x = 1− z, M = max(2√a, exp(1) ·B(1/2, k + 1)).
3. Sampe u from the uniform distribution over (0, 1).
4. If u < x−1/2/(M(1 + e−axBeta(x; 1/2, k + 1))), accept the sample; otherwise reject the
sample and try again.
The proposed rejection sampling scheme is efficient because when a  0 the density h(·) is very
skewed to one. Therefore, x−1/2 will be close to 1 and e−ax will be very samll, which means the
acceptance rate is high.
D.3 Justification of generative model in Section 4.2
Recall the generative model presented in Section 4.2:
1. For each ` ∈ [k], sample U` (orthonormal basis of S`) uniformly at random from Sdq .
2. For each i ∈ [n], sample zi ∈ [k] such that Pr[zi = j] = 1/k, yi uniformly at random
from the q-dimensional unit ball, and wi ∼ N (0, Id/ε). Set xi = U`yi + PU⊥` wi.
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Algorithm 5 Differentially private query answering via the SuLQ framework
1: Input: query parameters S1, · · · ,Sk ∈ Rqd, ` ∈ [k]; privacy parameters ε, δ > 0.
2: Let A` = {xi : argmin`′d(xi,S`′) = `} and form B = A`A>` .
3: Noise calibration: Set B˜ = B + σW, where W is a standard Normal random matrix and
σ = 2
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)/ε.
4: Singular value decomposition: Let B˜ = UVD> be the top-q singular value decomposition
of B˜. U ∈ Rd×q denotes the top q left singular vectors of B˜.
5: Output: new subspace S ′` spanned by columns of U.
In this section we derive a Gibbs sampler for the considered model and show that the derived Gibbs
sampler is identical to the one presented in Section 4.1. This result establishes formal connection
between our proposed Gibbs sampling algorithm for private subspace clustering and a probabilistic
graphical model that resembles the mixtures of probabilistic PCA (MPPCA, [27]) model.
First we note that the prior distribution specified in the generative model is completely non-
informative; that is, p0(θ) = p0(θ′) for any θ = (C,x,y, z) and θ′ = (C′,x′,y′, z′). On the
other hand, the likelihood model is as follows:
p(xi|zi = `,yi, C) =
{ N (xi; U`yi, Id/ε), if PS`xi = U`yi;
0, otherwise. (26)
Here U` ∈ Rd×q is an orthonormal basis associated with S` and PS` stands for the projection
operator onto subspace S`. Integrating yi out we obtain
p(xi|zi = `, C) ∝ exp
(
−ε
2
· d2(xi,S`)
)
. (27)
A Gibbs sampler can then be derived as follows:
Update of zi By Eq. (27), the conditional distribution of zi is
p(zi = `|xi, C) ∝ p0(zi = `)p(xi|zi = `, C) ∝ exp
(
−ε
2
· d2(xi,S`)
)
.
Therefore, we can sample zi from a normalized categorical distribution as specified above.
Update of S` By Eq. (27), the conditional distribution of S` is
p(S`|x, z) ∝ p0(S`)
∏
zi=`
p(xi|zi = `,S`) ∝ exp
(
−ε
2
·
∑
zi=`
d2(xi,S`)
)
.
Denote A` = {xi : zi = `} as all data points in cluster ` and let U` be the orthonormal basis of S`.
We then have
p(U`|x, z) ∝ exp
(ε
2
· tr(U>` A`U`)
)
,
which corresponds to a matrix Bingham distribution.
The above presented Gibbs sampler is identical to the one proposed in Section 4.1 in the main text,
thus justifying our use of the above-mentioned generative model as an equivalent characterization of
the proposed private subspace clustering algorithm. This is perhaps not surprising, as the marginal
likelihood model Eq. (27) is exactly the same with the sampling distribution dictated by the expo-
nential mechanism, as shown in Eq. (10) in the main text.
Appendix E Private subspace clustering via the SuLQ framework
In this section we introduce a simple iterative subspace clustering algorithm based on the SuLQ
framework [2]. Before presenting the algorithm, we first review k-plane [3], a straightforward iter-
ative method for subspace clustering:
1. For each data point xi, compute zi = argmin1≤`≤kd(xi,Sk).
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2. For each cluster `, let A` = {xi : zi = `} ∈ Rd×n` denote all data points assigned to
cluster `. Update S` as the linear subspace spanned by the top-q eigenvectors of A`A>` .
3. Repeat step 1 and 2 until convergence.
Suppose the k-plane algorithm is run for T iterations. From the pseudocode of k-plane, the algorithm
needs to query the database X for kT times, each time asking the following question:
- Given S1, · · · ,Sk and ` ∈ [k] as inputs, output the orthonormal basis U` ∈ Rd×q
of a q-dimensional subspace S ′` such that S ′` best captures A>` A`; i.e., ‖A`A>` −
(PS′`A`)(PS′`A`)>‖2 is minimized. Here A` is defined in terms of (S1, · · · ,Sk).
Algorithm 5 is a simple procedure that approximately answers the above question while preserving
(ε, δ)-differential privacy. It is in fact a special case of the SuLQ framework proposed in [2]. The
following proposition is immediate.
Proposition E.1. Algorithm 5 is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm.
Proof. Define b(X ) = vec(A>` A`) ∈ Rd
2
. LetX ′ be an arbitrary database such that d(X ,X ′) = 1.
That is, exactly one column x in X is replaced by a new column x′ in X ′. We then have
‖b(X )− b(X ′)‖22 ≤
d∑
i,j=1
(x′ix
′
j − xixj)2 ≤ 2
d∑
i,j=1
(x′2i x
′2
j + x
2
ix
2
j ) ≤ 4,
where the last inequality is due to the constraint ‖x‖2, ‖x′‖2 ≤ 1. Consequently,
∆2b = sup
d(X ,X ′)=1
‖b(X )− b(X ′)‖2 ≤ 2.
The Gaussian mechanism (Theorem A.1, [9]) then suggests that one can release b while preserving
(ε, δ)-differential privacy by calibrating i.i.d. Gaussian noise to b:
Release b(X ) + 2
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)
ε
·w,
where w is a d2-dimensional standard Normal. The final singular value decomposition step does
not affect privacy because differential privacy is close to post-processing.
The following proposition is then a direct application of advanced composition [9].
Proposition E.2. Suppose the k-plane algorithm is run for T iterations, each iteration query-
ing Algorithm 5 k times with privacy parameters ε and δ. Then the overall algorithm is (ε′, δ′)-
differentially private with
ε′ =
√
2kT ln(1/δ)ε+ kTε(eε − 1),
δ′ = (kT + 1)δ.
Appendix F Concentration theorems
Theorem F.1 ([44], Theorem 1.2). Let A be an n × n matrices with entries i.i.d. sampled from
standard Gaussian distribution. Then there exist absolute constants c1 > 0, 0 < c2 < 1 such that
for every t > 0,
Pr
[
σn(A) ≤ t
√
n
] ≤ c1t+ cn2 ,
where σn(A) is the least singular value of A.
Theorem F.2 (Wedin’s theorem; Theorem 4.1, pp. 260 in [45]). Let A,E ∈ Rm×n be given
matrices with m ≥ n. Let A have the following singular value decomposition U>1U>2
U>3
A [ V1 V2 ] = [ Σ1 00 Σ2
0 0
]
,
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where U1,U2,U3,V1,V2 have orthonormal columns and Σ1 and Σ2 are diagonal matrices. Let
A˜ = A + E be a perturbed version of A and (U˜1, U˜2, U˜3, V˜1, V˜2, Σ˜1, Σ˜2) be analogous sin-
gular value decomposition of A˜. Let Φ be the matrix of canonical angles between range(U1) and
range(U˜1) and Θ be the matrix of canonical angles between range(V1) and range(V˜1). If there
exists δ > 0 such that
min
i,j
∣∣[Σ1]i,i − [Σ2]j,j∣∣ > δ and min
i
∣∣[Σ1]i,i∣∣ > δ,
then
‖ sin Φ‖2F + ‖ sin Θ‖2F ≤
2‖E‖2F
δ2
.
Theorem F.3 ([32], Lemma 18, Properties of Gaussian random vectors). Let ε ∼ N (0, σ2d I) be a
d-dimensional random Gaussian vector with coordinate-wise variance σ2. Then the following holds
for some fixed z ∈ Rd and t, ρ > 0:
Pr
[‖εi‖22 > (1 + t)σ2] ≤ en2 (log(t+1)−t);
Pr
[∣∣〈εi, z〉∣∣ > ρ‖εi‖2‖z‖2] ≤ 2e−nρ22 .
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